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#StopThisMovie and the Pitfalls of Mass Atrocity Prevention: Framing of
Violence and Anticipation of Escalation in Burundi’s Crisis (2015-2017)
Andrea Purdeková

University of Bath
Bath, England

Introduction
The unforgotten1 and oft reminisced2 reluctance to name the 1994 violence in Rwanda as genocide
has left a mark on public conscience, and Burundi’s recent crisis represents the inversion of sorts
of this political economy of labeling violence. If in 1994 the label was a scarce resource, in 2015 it
became a currency widely spent, and arguably, devalued as a result. And whilst in 1994 the politics
revolved around labels triggering international obligations, today we deal with a whole gamut of
actors drawing on the label, some to trigger obligation in anticipation, as a preventative mechanism
(e.g., IOs and AU), some in search of close-enough comparators and familiar frames (e.g., media),
others to score political credit through the delegitimation of opponents (domestic actors, whether
opposition or the incumbents). Altogether, these dynamics offer rich insights into the changing
political economy of deployment of the ‘ultimate crime’ label. The deep politicization also forces
us to reflect on the status and continued usefulness of genocide as a dominant frame to activate in
times of crisis, and today as a distinctly anticipatory device to raise alarm rather than a post-facto
designation (such as with UN ICOIs).
The article analyses the vagaries of prevention3 and “preventative framing”4 of violence,
focusing both on how different actors portrayed points of “critical escalation” and the nature of
violence (mass atrocity) predicted in Burundi between 2015-2017.5 The #StopThisMovie prevention
campaign referenced in the title, aiming to prevent the crisis escalating to a genocide, reflects
the broader trend whereby observers have been consumed with anticipation and the framing of
“Burundi’s great fear.”6 The veritable genocide reticence-turned-logorrhea witnessed in this crisis
is directly tied to the perceived close resemblance of Burundi and Rwanda and hence the pressure
not to repeat the mistakes of the past, if not to make up for them. But, there is also the oft cited
“given the country’s history” clause.7 The pervasive analysis-by-analogy, however, is problematic.
It will be argued that the portrayal— the intimations that the recent crisis can lead to genocide, the
invocations of the ethnic frame, and the repeated comparisons with Rwanda and Burundi’s own
past— serves to obscure the core drivers of the recent violence and the dynamics of escalation on
the ground.
The paper then proceeds to investigate whether such representation might nonetheless be used
as currency to garner greater visibility and international involvement. In other words, can costs in
terms of accuracy be redeemed by greater attention? The argument that emerges here is that conflict
prevention has come at the cost of conflict resolution. Not only has attention failed to translate into
1

Hayes Brown, “The Inside Story Of How The U.S. Acted To Prevent Another Rwanda,” Think Progress, December 20,
2013, accessed March 15, 2017, https://thinkprogress.org/the-inside-story-of-how-the-u-s-acted-to-prevent-anotherrwanda-e91beac73aca.

2

The failure to intervene and the silent by-stander status of the international community in 1994 is the cornerstone of
political narratives in Rwanda and is often highlighted during commemorative periods by the President and the
political class more broadly. The guilt, argues Filip Reyntjens, has been turned into ‘genocide credit.’ See, Filip
Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004), 200. Beyond
Rwanda, the lack of international effort to prevent and later stop the genocide has left a deep imprint on international
conscience and has made genocide a cornerstone of the R2P norm and accompanying architecture developed since
1994.

3

Early warning specifically, rather than risk assessment.

4

See, David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006), 229. Scheffer argues
that analysts should use the ‘G’ word freely to “publicly describe precursors of genocide and react rapidly.”

5

The year 2015 marks the beginning of the crisis and 2017 is when this article was finalized but also when much of the
international attention has petered out.

6

Fred Bridgland, “Burundi’s ‘Great Fear,’” The Sunday Herald, January 3, 2016, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.
heraldscotland.com/news/14178785.Burundi_s__great_fear_/?ref=rss.

7

“Burundi Crisis: from Disputed Polls to ‘Genocide’ Fears,” JusticeInfo.net, October 12, 2016, accessed, March 15, 2017,
http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/resources/burundi-crisis-from-disputed-polls-to-genocide-fears.html.
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effective action in Burundi, the labeling practice might have produced some unintended, even
perverse effects. The greater international and regional resolve to act has in fact met with radical
rebuttals from the government, including the withdrawal from the ICC and pronouncement that
any international force would be seen as an invading force and engaged militarily.
But we cannot simply argue that the increased attention has been ineffective. Instead, we must
seriously consider the possibility of unintended effects. The article explores three propositions
in this regard: First, genocide-label-driven interventionism in Burundi has increased regime
isolationism and emboldened the regime to resort to sovereignty as an effective last resort measure
to shore up impunity. It has effectively lowered the government’s willingness to bow down,
cooperate and negotiate with its critics, arguably the opposite of the intended effect. Second, in
terms of violence, we must consider whether the genocide frame and campaigning has not merely
contributed to decreased visibility of violence and repression, which has now moved offstage.
Perhaps more seriously, we need to consider whether the campaigning has taken away energy
from civil war focus as a more pressing threat. Third, in terms of the genocide label, we must
consider that protracted alarm sounding devalues not only the G-word as currency, but strategic
labeling as a preventative device in general. Over two years of troughs and peaks of deployment
of the most powerful label, Burundi is no closer to an inclusive political dialogue. In the case of
Burundi at least, the mislabeling of the crisis has fueled the political standoff rather than helping
to resolve it.
The analysis serves as an opening to broader reflections on labeling of conflict in Africa. The paper
foregrounds the contested nature of labeling on the ground whereby labeling and representation
act as resources feeding political and conflict dynamics themselves, rather than being analytical
devices separate from the ongoing crisis. The recent (mis)characterization of conflict in Burundi in
fact enters a long-standing historical process of local contestation over conflict labels— including
over the term of genocide— that feed the cycles of metaconflict and conflict on the ground.8 The
paper concludes with reflections on whether/how the labels of “genocide” and “ethnic conflict”
are still useful to our understanding of conflict in a region where they have been typically intensely
deployed. The paper also cautions against the unbridled use of the label of genocide for prevention
and makes a call for a more self-reflective and politically conscious preventive framing.
Labeling Conflict: The Uses, Manipulations and Impacts of Crisis Portrayal
The present paper unpicks the tensions between two frameworks that see labeling as a
representational resource. The first focuses on labeling as a potentially positive resource garnering
preventive action. As such, this conception of labeling is embedded within the problem-solving
framework of conflict management. The second offers a more politicized reading of labeling
as a “symbolic technology”9 opening the space for contested forms of potentially self-defeating
interventionism. As such, it presents a more critical frame of conflict transformation. The difference
is important. While the former framework implicitly treats labeling as separate from the unfolding
conflict, the latter sees it as part and parcel of the conflict (struggle over dominance) and metaconflict
(conflict over the meaning of the confrontation). Adopting but expanding the latter framework, the
current paper looks not merely at the intended effects of intervention, but rather the unstated and
unintended effects of increased attention unmatched by effective preventative action.
It is now a well-established dictum that the way we talk about violence affects the way we
respond to it, affectively and collectively. “Recognised severity of political problems – including
government-organized or sanctioned mass killings is a function of the socio-linguistic processing

8

For a discussion of a 1995 COI on Burundi and the impacts of its designation of ‘acts of genocide’ on the broader
metaconflict, see Andrea Purdeková, “Fact-Finding as a Conflict Resource? The Political Anatomy of International
Investigative Missions on Burundi (1993, 1995, 2015),” Unpublished Manuscript, 2017.

9

Roland Marchal, “Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia,”
International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007), 1091-1106.
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and naming of them.”10 The “power to define”11 revolves around labels’ potential to catalyze
outrage and mobilize action, but also their propensity to structure “hierarchies of concern.”12 In this
respect, the label of genocide trumps other characterizations, in general, and especially in Africa
and the Great Lakes Region. While “there is no hierarchy of crimes in international law… popular
understanding of genocide as the “ultimate crime” generate obvious incentives for victims and
their advocates to invoke the “G word” to rally support for intervention, even when the objective
criteria for genocide are not met.”13 The existence of a purpose-made genocide convention also
“reinforces the public acknowledgment of genocide’s special status, not only as a matter of criminal
law, but as a moral outrage to humanity.”14 After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the label has indeed
been widely invoked by political actors and civil society alike across a broad range of conflict and
countries in Africa, ranging from Sudan/Darfur to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and beyond.
But the recent, and much more intense and sustained, deployment of the label in Burundi
cannot be seen outside of the country’s physical and perceived social proximity to Rwanda. It is the
status of Burundi as the “false twin”15 of its neighbor that gives the G word particular traction in
this case.16 The recent case of Burundi then wedges open the pressing query of what impacts ensue
when the G word is applied intensely and aggressively, rather than cautiously or half-heartedly as
in the past, and in anticipation rather than after the fact.
In its study of impacts, the current paper opens up beyond the two dominant analytical
tendencies, in line with its more critical take on labels’ role in an unfolding conflict. First, the
paper does not paint a simple story of “reductionist media,” a mislabeling borne of benevolent
outsiders looking from the outside in. Instead, the paper foregrounds the constellation of different
actors that co-produce the narrative on Burundi, foreign and local, and the ways in which the
G label permeates political dynamics on the ground. The participants in the commentary on the
Burundi crisis include academics attempting to be relevant by blogging and contributing quotes
for news coverage, news correspondents attempting more in-depth political analysis, and experts
and government officials “cybertimately” exchanging fire on twitter. To understand the political
economy of the genocide label and its impacts, we first must acknowledge and understand this
complex configuration of actors and interests.
Second, understanding impacts means moving beyond the study of intended effects to
unintended, even potentially counter-intuitive ones. The difficulty of translating increased attention
and resolve triggered by the G label into effective action has been highlighted before,17 and seems
painfully to be the case in Burundi again, where international attempts at intervention and criminal
investigation have not borne their desired results. But a frame focused on effectiveness is limiting.
It obscures other effects borne of action and inaction.
10

William F.S. Miles, “Labeling ‘Genocide’ in Sudan: A Constructionist Analysis of Darfur,” Genocide Studies and Prevention
1, no. 3 (2006), 251-263.

11

Ibid., 254.

12

Ibid.

13

Kate Cronin-Furman and Michael Broache, “Should We be Using the G-word in Burundi?,” Washington Post, December
15, 2015, accessed March 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/15/should-webe-using-the-g-word-in-burundi/?utm_term=.d684c4a4cd67.

14

Miles, Labeling Genocide in Sudan, 261.

15

René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

16

“The events in Burundi [after all] are unfolding in the long shadow of Rwanda [its neighbor]. Observers – whether
political figures, UN representatives, journalists, or non-governmental organizations – have the vocabulary of modern
genocide prevention at their disposal because of the lessons their respective organizations endeavored to absorb
over the past two decades following the genocide in Rwanda.” In Conor Gaffey, “Burundi Must Learn the Lessons
of Rwanda to Avoid Genocide,” Newsweek, December 11, 2015, accessed March 20, 2017, http://europe.newsweek.
com/burundi-must-learn-lessons-rwanda-avoid-genocide-336428. It is not only vocabulary, however, that Rwanda
bequeathed onto the international community, but a new moral impulse to act, translated into the R2P doctrine and a
new policy and institutional architecture such as the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in the US or the United Nations
Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide.

17

The examples are Darfur in Sudan or the Central African Republic (CAR). In the latter case, ‘while [the APB] has
certainly helped formulate policy, it hasn’t been a silver bullet to end the crisis in the CAR,’ see, Haynes, the Inside
Story.
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There is now a budding literature exploring the unintended effects of conflict portrayal in
the African context. Perhaps most prominently, Séverine Autesserre18 has traced the effects of
“dangerous tales” – dominant conflict narratives— on the actual dynamics of violence in the
DRC. She shows how the portrayal of causes, impacts and solutions of the crisis has been reduced
to three powerful but reductive frames focused on natural resources, sexual violence and statebuilding, respectively. The “danger” inherent in the tales is not simply them obscuring the key
causes of violence and its complexity, the variety of impacts beyond rape, and the problems of the
unquestioned embrace of central state-building. The danger also lies with the perverse effects – the
tales’ tendency to increase the very violence they were meant merely to depict. Autesserre shows
how the intense focus on rape has elevated sexual violence’ saliency among armed actors, some of
whom have deployed it to gain attention and a seat at the negotiating table.19
Last but not least, a broader conception of actors and impacts needs to be matched by a closer
reading of the historical record. The little-observed fact in the ongoing coverage of the crisis is that
this is not the first time that controversy arises over the labeling of violence in Burundi and the
label of genocide in particular. Neither is this the only chapter in Burundi’s story of an interaction
between conflict portrayal and the actual conflict on the ground.20 We need to understand that
Burundi has made a transition from decades of imposed silence on state-perpetrated violence and
the manipulations of portrayal of the conflict by successive governments, and largely international
oblivion, to selective application of the genocide label through the 1995 Commission of Inquiry
(COI) on Burundi,21 to an intense discourse surrounding the label and the international spotlight
of today. We also see a move from post-facto designation or management of conflict labels to the
anticipatory framing of today. This longer history and politics surrounding the G word are not
merely ‘context’ but again help shape the label’s deployment and impact today.
Portraying the Crisis in Burundi: Analogy, Intimation, and Imminence
The present section outlines the anatomy of portrayal of the crisis in Burundi, from its inception in
early 2015 to early 2017, exactly two years later, paying particular attention to the ways in which
violence and its escalation is described and/or intimated to a wider audience, often in order to
influence it, create impact and garner action. The paper analyzes available commentary on the crisis
produced by a variety of actors and a range of published sources, including news outlets, UN and
other international and regional organizations’ releases, academic blogs and news interventions,
social media commentary, speeches by foreign and domestic dignitaries and organizations, and
beyond. Study of primary and secondary sources is matched by original fieldwork carried out in
Burundi in both 2013 and at the inception of the current crisis in 2015.
The study grew out of an observed systematic pattern in the style of reporting on the crisis.
Importantly, I did not choose ‘genocide’ as a search filter as this could introduce two forms of bias.
18

Séverine Autessere, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences,”
African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012), 202-222.

19

A number of other authors have explored the strategic nature of labelling and its potential to obscure the drivers
of conflict and hence to potentially undermine prospects of resolution. Scorgie-Porter in her study of the Allied
Democratic Forces (a Uganda-born but DRC-based rebel group) demonstrates how the globally potent label of
terrorism and Islamic extremism came to take dominance in describing this militant group, thus obscuring important
aspects of the group’s constitution and the drivers underpinning mobilization into the group and its persistence.
Scorgie-Porter shows that the Ugandan government has been actively framing the group in line with the global
discourse on terrorism “in order to draw resources, military, diplomatic and otherwise that stem from participation
in the war on terror.” See, Lindsay Scorgie-Porter, “Militant Islamists or Borderland Dissidents? An Exploration into
the Allied Democratic Forces’ Recruitment and Constitution,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 1 (2015),
1-25. Similarly, in their study of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) framing, Titeca and Costeur try to understand and
explain the divergent portrayals of the same armed actor by different governments (Ugandan, Congolese and US)
through the lens of their strategic objectives. See, Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, “An LRA for Everyone: How
Different Actors Frame the Lord’s Resistance Army,” African Affairs 114, no. 454 (2015), 92-114.

20

See, Purdeková, Fact-Finding.

21

The 1995 International Commission of Inquiry on Burundi concluded the 1993 killings of Tutsi civilians amount to ‘acts
of genocide.’ No comparable commission has been launched to investigate and qualify the genocide of 1972. See,
United Nations, Letter Dated 25 July 1996 from secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, August
22, 1996 (UN Doc. S/1996/682), 74, accessed March 30, 2017, https://undocs.org/S/1996/682.
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First, it would run the risk of skewing findings by excluding alternative portrayals, or conversely
other dominant labels.22 Second, it would obscure a dynamic whereby the notion of ‘genocide’
is very effectively implied without being directly mentioned. The latter aspect is much more
than a methodological consideration and in fact turns out to be a key finding of the paper. The
research presented here shows the power of insinuation, and how ambiguity can still communicate
specificity. “Every instance of language and action,” writes Edelman, “resonates with the memory,
the fear or the anticipation of other signifiers, so that there are radiating networks of meaning.”23
The paper will show that intimation and anticipation can be powerful techniques of building affect
and, indeed, forms of very specific labeling. This is what can be called “silent labeling” or “implicit
labeling.”
A close reading of a wide array of text reveals systematic comparison of Burundi to Rwanda
and a repeated insinuation that the current crisis is an ethnic conflict that can result in genocide.
This is the case even in articles that clearly mention that political cleavage is key. Three discursive
strategies arise and will be demonstrated below: i) analysis by analogy (proof by indirect parallel);
ii) intimation without mention (implicit labeling); and iii) insinuation of imminence of escalation
(momentum building). In terms of the analysis-by-analogy, this is two-fold: parallels are rendered
with events in neighboring Rwanda, and with events in Burundi’s own past. These rhetorical
strategies are pervasive. But analysis-by-analogy is not only logically problematic. It generalizes
and lumps countries into the same basket (Burundi is largely like Rwanda and hence faces the
same fate of genocide) and builds a distinctly primordial and unchanging notion of African
societies centered around ethnicity as the main cleavage (i.e., Burundi’s conflict in the past and
hence today is about ethnicity). The ethnic frame is so powerful that it is inconceivable that, should
mass violence occur, it could fall across other-than-ethnic (i.e., political) lines. Genocide in press is
squarely “ethnic genocide.” Interestingly, even in reporting that highlights the changing nature of
conflict centered today around political loyalties, the analysis inevitably leads to claiming there are
risks of ethnic polarization and/or that the ethnic aspect remains important.
Already very early on in the crisis, on April 28, 2015, just after President Pierre Nkurunziza
announced his intention to run for a controversial third term and vast protests were met with (and
in fact preceded by) sustained intimidation by the Imbonerakure youth wing of the ruling party, the
New York Times reproduced the dominant discourse rather faithfully: “
As Burundi edges towards a precipice, parallels with 1994 Rwanda are not unfounded. Like
in Rwanda’s genocide, the Imbonerakure— or at least the more radical elements— appear
ready to target civilians en masse. Although Burundi’s crisis is primarily one of politics, with
antagonisms crossing ethnic boundaries, there is also an ethnic dimension.

Drawing on analogies is met with ambiguity of the target group, portrayal of imminence, and
the underlining of an “ethnic dimension,” opening the possibility of “ethnic genocide.”24
A year later, on April 10, 2016, another major news outlet reproduced a strikingly similar
discourse, this time though putting the dominant discursive frame on ever clearer display: “Burundi
neighbors Rwanda and has a similar ethnic make-up to the country whose genocide in 1994 still
casts long shadows of shame and fear. Like Rwanda, Burundi has also seen bitter, genocidal wars
between Hutu and Tutsi.”25 Both strands of analysis-by-analogy are present here (invocation of
neighboring Rwanda and Burundi’s own past), as well as intimation without mention (the current
crisis is never explicitly labeled as genocide but this is very effectively implied), the dominance of
the ethnic frame in understanding Burundi’s conflict and ethnic essentialism.
This last excerpt faithfully reflects the narrative techniques witnessed elsewhere whereby
numerous articles on the crisis would incorporate (usually end with) precisely this clause,
22

23

As a strategic resource, ‘genocide’ enters a list of other high profile and strategic labels such as ‘terrorism’ or
‘insurgency’ used by the government to delegitimize the opposition forces and garner attention and resources. Even if
notable and offering opening to interesting analyses, these labels are limited to the domestic political level, and have
not seen the exposure and intensity of deployment that ‘genocide’ did.

Miles, Labeling Genocide in Sudan, 254.
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highlighting parallels with Rwanda and the ethnic make-up of the country. To give a sense
of the systematic nature of the portrayal, I include additional excerpts from a range of news
outlets, with the proviso that this is far from exhaustive. On February 3, 2016, Reuters reported
that “Nkurunziza’s re-election for a third term last year sparked the country’s crisis and raised
concerns that there could be a bloody ethnic conflict in a region where memories of Rwanda’s 1994
genocide are still fresh.”26 The clause combines analogy, intimation, and ethnic framing. Another
article from the Star on November 11, 2015, suggests “the moral failure to boldly challenge [the
Rwandan] genocide haunts us still. This time we should name it for what it is, and confront it.”27
Here we again see both analysis-by-analogy and intimation. Telegraph’s piece from November 10,
2015, entitled “We are powerless to stop Rwandan-style genocide in Burundi, admits UN” again
draws on analogy and intimation: “Burundi ended a 12-year civil war in 2005, when Hutu rebels
fought the army led by Tutsis, the same ethnic divide that led to Rwanda’s 1994 genocide in which
800,000 people were massacred.” This excerpt is interesting because it proceeds through a two-step
analogy. It suggests that past conflict in Burundi is defined by ethnicity (implicitly assuming it still
is, suggesting analogy with the past), and that this very same ethnic cleavage has led to genocide
in a neighboring country (intimating fear of genocide).
But as mentioned at the outset, this is not simply a story of reductionist media as this sort
of portrayal is reproduced by other actors and for a number of motives, demonstrating the
different facets of the broader political economy of crisis labeling. Nonetheless, media often pick
up and quote from these other sources and actors. One of the prominent voices has been the UN,
acting through its office of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of
Genocide, Adama Dieng. The office is geared towards mobilizing early action and the rhetoric
reflects this. On November 9, 2015, Dieng urged the Security Council to intervene in Burundi “to
prevent a replay of past horrors,”28 warning inaction risks Burundi “slid[ing] back into an all too
familiar chaos… No one should underestimate what is at stake, he said, recalling that the country’s
own history and that of its neighbor, Rwanda, has shown the tragic consequences of failing to act
when leaders incite violence.”29 The 2016 UN report of the Independent Investigation on Burundi
suggests “given the country’s history, the danger of the crime of genocide also looms large.”30
Analogies and intimation re-appear.
The genocide label has been applied quite explicitly by national and international NGOs. The
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) and the Burundian Ligue ITEKA have perhaps
been the most vocal, co-authoring a 200 page report at the end of 2016 entitled “Repression and
Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi.”31 The report concludes that “all criteria and conditions for
the perpetration of genocide are in place: ideology, intent, security institutions, mobilization via
militias, identifying populations to be eliminated and using historical justifications.” The report
concludes that there is evidence of intent to destroy, in whole or in part an ethnic group, that of
the Tutsi.32 The lengthy and detailed reasoning might seem to contrast starkly with the snippets of

26

Michelle, Nichols, “U.N. Expert Find Bid to Smuggle Congo Arms via Rwanda to Burundi Rebels,” Reuters, February 4,
2016, accessed April 5, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-rwanda-congodemocratic-idUKKCN0VD2HM.

27

“Burundi Crisis Resembles Run-up to Rwanda Genocide: Editorial,” The Star, November 11, 2015, accessed March 15,
2017, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2015/11/11/burundi-crisis-resembles-run-up-to-rwanda-genocideeditorial.html.

28

“Burundi Experiencing ‘Deep Political Crisis’ with Hundreds Dead Since April, Security Council told,” United Nations
News Centre, November 9, 2015, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52503#.
WQT8yKWRpuY3.

29

Ibid.

30

United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB)
established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1, September 20, 2016 (UN Doc. A/HRC/33/37), 19,
accessed March 12, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/report-united-nations-independent-investigationburundi-uniib-established-pursuant.

31

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) & Ligue ITEKA, “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,”
Report No. 685a, November 2016, accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi_report_english-2.
pdf.

32

Ibid.
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text incorporated into news reports, but close scrutiny suggests that the analytical process is in fact
similar and revolves around the notion of “mirroring.”
“Voices from within the AU and elsewhere are warning that Burundi today mirrors the preApril 1994 situation in Rwanda,”33 suggests the Scotland Herald. The FIDH-ITEKA report proceeds
through a similar analysis-by-analogy but in a far greater detail. The projection through mirroring
carries with it its own logical problems as one might read into divergent phenomena a convergent
purpose such as when distribution of machetes, distribution of mobile phones to chefs de colline or
construction of latrines in the countryside are cited as evidence of a genocidal plan.34 The mirroring
logic has it that such implements were used in 1994 in a neighboring country to facilitate genocidal
killing, ipso facto these events spell a preparation for a possible genocide in Burundi. The text on
latrine construction demonstrates the mirroring analytics well:
On 1 May 2016, President Nkurunziza announced that community work, which takes place
every Saturday, would henceforth focus on installing latrines […] alongside all roads, in all
local communities (collines), at marketplaces and in all other public spaces. Our organizations
are concerned that these latrines may be used as mass graves, as has been the case during
the current crisis and in 1994 at the time of the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda. Some months
before the genocide there, the Rwandan authorities had ordered the construction of latrines
throughout the country and these were transformed into pits for bodies between April and
July 1994.35

Importantly, labeling here (calling the crisis “repression with genocidal dynamics”36) has the
potential to create anxiety and a resurgence of traumatic memory. Fear thrives on analogies. It is
Burundians themselves who start seeing familiar patterns in the happenings around them. The
worried observations of surging numbers of phones in hands of local authorities and machete
distributions after all come from “sources on the ground.”37 Others such as refugees might use
genocide as a ready-made frame they know has impact. A young arrival at the refugee Mahama
camp, claiming he was assaulted by the Imbonerakure militias, explained that “we fled because
they said they were going to do a genocide of Tutsis that don’t accept the views of Nkurunziza.”38
The genocide frame must be seen as mutually constituted and its impacts as reaching beyond
problematic analysis.
On the level of domestic politics, the opposition has used the term to garner action against
the government, while the government has used different outlets to counter these claims. “Indeed,
members of the political opposition in Burundi began invoking the risk of genocide as early as
February 2014.”39 More recently in April 2017, the Spokesman of the opposition umbrella CNARED
has suggested with reference to the Imbonerakure chants inciting members to sexual violence that
“what is going on is a copy-paste of what happened in Rwanda before the Genocide of 1994.”40
Meanwhile, “Government officials in Burundi bristle at the comparison [with Rwandan
genocide]. Presidential spokesman Willy Nyamitwe said ‘There will be no war or genocide,’ while
maintaining the government was trying to suppress ‘acts of terrorism (…).’”41 Interestingly, the
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government has resorted to the label when it proved profitable. The government accused its neighbor
Rwanda of arming refugees in camps, thus fomenting genocide in Burundi. Pascal Nyabenda, the
President of the ruling CNDD-FDD party has accused Paul Kagame of “recruiting and training
young Burundians in refugee camps in Rwanda, so that they can return home to commit acts of
genocide.”42 This was a clear provocation to a government that styles itself as a liberator and one
that ends genocide rather than exports it, pointing at the strained bilateral relations between these
two countries. Indeed, Kagame did not abstain from further bolstering this symbolic capital by
announcing that Burundi “should have learned from our history.” He called on Burundi “not to
repeat the ethnic violence that ended in genocide in his country in 1994.”43
Overall then, we cannot see the prominence of the label simply through the lens of the press,
but rather the constellation of actors that have together embraced its renewed value in order to
influence action by external actors and the course of the conflict on the ground. But as shown, the
label’s power seeps beyond politics of intervention and legitimization, being appropriated as a
ready-made and useful frame, and with the all-too-real potential to affect the sense of security and
contribute to anxiety by resuscitating memories of a violent past.
But some caveats are due to the story of the label’s prominence as drawn up thus far. First, it
is questionable whether ordinary Burundians resort to the label of genocide at all. In my research
between 2013 and 2015, this term seemed to pertain mostly to international and national civil society
and organizations, with ordinary people choosing ambiguous and general ways of describing past
events of violence in the country, including the “selective genocide” of 1972. With the crisis and
intense deployment of the term its salience has surely increased and people interfacing with the
humanitarian architecture might choose it as a way to render their situation intelligible to them.
Second, we must acknowledge a level of heterodoxy and the dissenting voices. A number of blogs,
reports and most academics have been disputing the ethnic portrayal of the crisis and the rush to
label the crisis as genocide.44 Despite these important caveats, it remains the case that genocide as
a label has gained traction and has been intensely deployed in reference to Burundi, in ways that
alternative framings of the crisis have not. The effects of this are explored in the next section.
Last but not least, the way in which the dominant portrayal works with time and across time
is interesting. The temporal dimension here refers both to how the genocide discourse builds
expectation and utilizes anticipations of escalation, and to its own endurance across time. In
terms of anticipation, the portrayal works with the notion of imminence. FIDH’s #StopThisMovie
campaign is a good example. The organization has been promoting a fake movie trailer “Genocide
in Burundi, by Pierre Nkurunziza” with the tagline “the only movie you don’t want to see.” The
short clip shows screaming Burundian children running for their lives through windings red
paths crisscrossing verdant valley floors. The camera chases after them, closing up on them like a
predator, while rhythmic, ominous music plays in the background. Fake media clips flash across
the screen: “Huge Bloodshed,” “Climate of Fear,” “Deadly Violence,” “Mass Atrocities.” The last
screen entirely bathed in red announces: “As you are reading this, the risk of genocide in Burundi
is imminent. Act together and prevent this fiction from becoming reality #StopThisMovie.”
The language of imminence is a systematic feature of the discourse hoping to garner preventive
action. In April 2015, NYT speaks of Burundi “on the brink,” “edg[ing] towards a precipice.”45
In November 2015, Adama Dieng speaks of a “tipping point”46 and so does France’s deputy
ambassador to the UN, Alexis Lamek:47 “The escalating violence in Burundi has reached a very
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worrying stage, maybe a tipping point,” he suggested, “If we let the tensions escalate without
doing anything, the whole country could explode.” In January 2016, Minority Rights International
warns of “a tipping point.”48 Most recently, in an article from January 2017 entitled “Burundi: Time
is Running Out,” the author describes an “escalating crisis.”49 The situation in Burundi is indeed
dire, both in terms of repression, human rights violations and unmet basic needs. But the repeated
referral to tipping points clashes with what is instead a gradual yet pervasive entrenchment of a
new and worrying status quo. The repeated evocations of imminent and irreversible escalation are
nonetheless interesting, and the next section will ask what sort of effects are borne when repeated
alarm isn’t met with the desired response.
Bearing Effects: How Genocide Alarm Interacts with the Ongoing Conflict
In the present section, I want to make three key arguments about the unintended effects of
sounding the genocide alarm on Burundi for over two years in the context of failing international
action. First, the ‘ethnic genocide’ frame obscures the political drivers of the crisis and the anatomy
of likely escalation – that of civil war— which is no less serious. But the intensity of focus makes
this more than a story of misrepresentation as the framing takes away energy from an alternative
approach (i.e., missed representation). Second, genocide prevention driven interventionism has
in fact emboldened and radicalized regime isolationism, and by extension, narrowed the leeway
of the regional and international community in fostering government cooperation and dialogue.
Genocide is a radical accusation leveled at the government and due to its known impact, has been
eagerly taken up as resource by actors ranging from the opposition to international media and civil
society. But radical accusations have tended to radicalize the government’s own stance. Third and
last, protracted crying wolf has devalued the G word as currency in Burundi, raising questions
about its usefulness as a preventive frame over time.
Taken together, these findings suggest that i) genocide framing cannot be disconnected from
the conflict dynamics on the ground; and that ii) rather than preventing escalation, the genocide
framing has potentially further entrenched the political standoff in Burundi. It has not averted
the entrenchment of repression in the country and has failed to open up key channels of political
solution to the crisis, raising the risk of return to civil war.
The ethnic genocide frame obfuscates the nature of the conflict in Burundi today and how
conflict dynamics have changed over time. More broadly, it maintains African conflict in the
representational straightjacket of ethnic conflict, a familiar but flawed paradigm. This paradigm
has a tendency to i) conflate cause and description (people might be targeted based on ethnicity,
which is different from ethnic fear or hate causing the violence), ii) to conflate cause and effect
(cleavages and polarization often result from conflict rather than being caused by it), and iii) to
obscures change over time (underlying causes and even descriptives change).
The misrepresentation in the case of Burundi results from the failure to draw these important
distinctions and from the ease of reading the past into the present. Burundi has indeed seen genocides
of both Hutu and Tutsi in the past (1972 and 1993, respectively). Its neighbor Rwanda is indeed
deceptively similar in its ethnic make-up and has seen a genocide as well— that of the Tutsi in 1994.
But even Rene Lemarchand’s seminal book entitled “Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide” does
not argue ethnicity is a cause of protracted violence across Burundi’s post-independence history.
While the conflict certainly fell across ethnic lines (with other important lines of cleavage, including
intra-ethnic/regional also playing their part), at heart it tied to systematic political exclusion of the
Hutu from power and the ruling ethnocracy’s escalating repressive measures against any political
and military challenge mounted by the majority.
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But today, we cannot read the crisis in these same terms, the Hutu are no longer excluded from
power. The protest movement and opposition that emerged in reaction to the President’s decision
to hold on to power and the regime’s increasing authoritarianism are decidedly cross ethnic, as
are the refugees, and the casualties. This is not to deny that ethnic animosities linger on or that
some people on the ground do in fact read the past through an ethnic lens. Violence has a tendency
to harden inter-group boundaries and that violent past has not been ever dealt with through a
functional transitional justice mechanism. But this simply cannot explain the onset of the current
crisis, its more structural drivers, the nature of the escalation, or even the descriptives – who is
targeted, who is intimidated, who flees. Both the causatives and the descriptives are distinctly
political today. The conflict in Burundi has transformed.
In fact, we need to highlight two rather counter-intuitive dynamics. First, we can argue that
what stubbornly remains a form of “success” amidst crisis is Burundi’s power-sharing architecture
set up under the 2000 Arusha peace accord, a complex consociational arrangement carefully
distributing power among the two dominant ethnic groups. As Reyntjens has argued, this has
effectively resulted in “ethnic pacification” in Burundi.50 Second, the increased attention to and
alarmism regarding “ethnic genocide” might, in a self-fulfilling prophecy fashion, perversely
contribute to the very dynamics the discourse is trying to avert. In a tense political environment,
hyperbole has the potential to fan fear and suspicion, and to contribute to ethnic polarization.
But if the ethnic frame is ill fitting, and if what is at stake is political partisanship – with
perceived opposition being the target of violence and repression— could we still argue that genocide
could result? Strictly speaking, the UN definition does not allow for political opinion (stated or
imputed) as a basis of genocide, a limitation critiqued by the likes of Leo Kuper and Helen Fein
who propose alternative concepts such as politicide. Interestingly, this option – targeting based on
political opinion aiming for categorical extermination— is extremely difficult for many observers
of the current crisis to fathom. Even as they highlight the political nature of the conflict, the risk of
genocide is read almost invariably on an ethnic basis.
But is Burundi at risk of politicide being committed? Arguably, neither ethnicity nor collective
targeting for annihilation is correct as an analytical lens. The government has indeed targeted its
opponents en masse and systematically. By and large, the method has not been physical violence
but effective intimidation. The casualty counts remain relatively low, even as human rights abuses
in detention have ballooned. The Imbonerakure militias together with the memories of a violent past
have performed most of the labor, producing widespread anxiety, fear and lending believability
to the threats. The result is mass outflows of people, and though not all leave because (or solely
because) of political intimidation, a large portion of the opposition, including civil society and
human rights watchdogs have fled abroad. Almost 400,000 Burundians have fled their country,
which matches the peaks of displacement during its civil war and after the 1972 genocide. But we
also know that opposition abroad means opportunities for mobilization and potentially armed
struggle if political platforms for resolution do not work. Based on the available evidence then,
the threat of escalation in Burundi is not to genocide, but an insurgency (or insurgencies) and/or a
full-scale civil war.
Certainly, it can be argued that different forms of violence can and do co-occur. But it is
important to look at the relationship between them. As Scott Straus has shown, civil war involving
a collectively framed opponent –typically ethnically framed but could be otherwise- is what really
heightens the risk of genocide.51 This has been the case in Rwanda in 1994, and in Burundi in 1972
and 1993. This causality chain suggests that, properly speaking, what needs attention and needs to
be prevented is escalation to civil war, which under some circumstances can lead to genocide. This
means that what needs to be promoted is a political solution and dialogue, rather than military
interventionism and policing of the regime, the effects of which can range from ineffective to
counter-productive.
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Looking at the inside of the country, our analysis does not render too dissimilar a set of
conclusions. Between years 2015-2017 (the latter year marking the finalization of this draft), we
have seen a significant democratic rollback: systematic repression and human rights abuse, the
dismantling of freedoms and liberties, attack on the free press and civil society. The economic
and humanitarian situation is dire. As the country implodes, the government chooses to repress
grievances rather than to open up inclusive dialogue and search for a political solution. This
directly contributes to escalation of the conflict as sections of the opposing forces might consider
military solutions as the only viable ones. We have seen precisely these dynamics unfold in
real time, first with an unsuccessful military coup, increasingly violent protests, and formation
of militant groups abroad.52 The discourse of tipping points and a precipice also largely missed
what were more gradual but steady and hard-to-reverse escalations. Overall then, what is at stake
with genocide labeling is not simply misrepresentation, but missed representation— the focus on
genocide prevents another, more appropriate frame from being applied and driving action.
The logic of violence in the crisis has itself evolved, with genocide labeling playing its own
part. After an acute phase of protest and repression in the streets, the government has managed to
crush domestic public enough to assure a level of submission. The government calls this “peace”
and “stability” when what we witness is a cementing of a new status quo based on effective
intimidation and repression that has now moved offstage to detention, policing, intimidation
and selective assassination. Though evidence for genocidal violence was not present at any point
during the crisis, the intense alarm sounding and salience of genocide has certainly assured that
the government would not try any of the sort. Again, labeling produces endogeneity effects – it is
not an “independent” variable in the crisis. This effect and government’s carefulness should not be
read as a form of “paradoxical success,” however. The type of violence that might actually come
about and that the genocidal framing overlooks might be as deadly, if not more widespread.
Why has a misfitting frame been so vigorously embraced? One reason is certainly the weight
carried by the G word and hoped-for ability to garner action. But this is not the full story; the
nature of analysis is key as well. The anatomy of the Burundi crisis portrayal reveals the distinct
logics of analysis-through-analogy, mirroring, and correlation. One could attribute this solely to
the ease with which an untrained eye sees parallels in a region whose past has seen a number of
genocides unfold. But there is also the broader issue of enduring and reductive metanarratives on
Africa’s conflict and identity, their nexus, and their unchanging character. Finally, and importantly,
prevention diagnostics can themselves mislead. Early warning is based on identifying a set of
indicators that typically precede genocide, working essentially on a correlative basis rather than an
in-depth study of causalities.
Verdejo reviewed multiple frameworks and compiled a rather exhaustive list of the indicators
that feature on them.53 The list approach does not give guides as to causal combinatorics, it does
not identify what aspects are essential, in what combinations and under what conditions. It might
also inflate threat because a number of indicators might have divergent possible outcomes or
causes (i.e., repression or transfer of weapons to security forces). But most importantly, a lot of the
indicators, when assessed closely, simply do not apply to Burundi. They all revolve around the
notion of targeting of a specific group, and the stepping up of that targeting such as rallies against
the group; stripping of rights and citizenship, hate rhetoric, or physical segregation. The genocide
frame implies that such targeting of Tutsi in Burundi exists, but the targeting that does exist is of
opposition, of which Tutsi are a part, rather than of the group per se. It does not revolve around
denaturalization and dehumanization in its varied forms, rather around repression and its tactics.
If we were to follow the mirroring/parallels frame, we would also see key ingredients missing that
were present in the three regional genocides—a context of an armed insurgency or violent coup
(both in Rwanda 1994 and Burundi 1972 and 1993) and the killing of political leaders (in Rwanda
1994 and Burundi 1993).
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To conclude, if the genocide frame is limiting, could the recently popularized “mass atrocity”
frame be more fitting? It is David Scheffer who has called for the introduction of the new term
“atrocity crimes” and a new field of international law (“atrocity law”) to describe serious human
rights abuses including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in “a single term that is
easily understood by the public.”54 The attempt is then usefully to move beyond the narrow frame
of genocide and call attention to a range of serious crimes without elevating one as the ultimate
violation. Hence the new phrase “mass atrocity prevention.” The Burundi context certainly fits
better with the rubric of crimes against humanity as we have witnessed torture in detention,
disappearances and widespread persecution. But there are two important caveats. As a call to
action, persecution and even torture remain weak grounds, as evidenced in case after case of
such “peace crimes.” In fact, here it is much more effective to argue for the risk of civil war and
insurgency, as these bear a high risk of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and in fact heighten
the risk of genocide being committed.55 Connected to this, while mass atrocity better captures the
nature of crimes perpetrated by the Burundian government, it does not get to the core of what
drives conflict escalation in the country, and hence what can drive increased incidence of mass
atrocity. It is largely a descriptive tool rather than a predictive one.
If “missed representation” is perhaps the most important impact of the genocide framing,
others cannot be neglected, including the argument that attempts at genocide-prevention-driven
interventionism have radicalized the Burundi’s government’s stance towards international and
regional cooperation. Though regional and international bodies allow intervention into third states
against their will on R2P grounds (if genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes occur), in
Burundi such intervention force has failed to materialize.
In December 2015, at the heels of a mass government crackdown in response to attack on army
bases and a surge in the genocide rhetoric and framing, the AU announced that it would create
a 5,000-troop strong force (MAPROBU) to protect civilians in Burundi. Almost immediately, the
government threatened that any unauthorized force would be engaged militarily. The AU force
would be considered, the government stated, “an attack on the country and every Burundian will
stand up and fight against them.”56 The very aim of the genocide framing then—decisive action—
was thwarted. Not only did AU fail to send in a peacekeeping force, the UN failed to send in an
unarmed police force of 228 in July 2016.
But the story is not simply one of failed intervention. It is also a story of how radical accusation
(of the ultimate crime) and threats of intervention interacted with the government’s willingness to
cooperate at all. The government has closed in on itself. There has been a visible effect over time.
Two years of close scrutiny and high-level pronouncements on genocide signals, pointing of fingers
to hate speech, accusations of ethnic profiling and incitements to ethnic violence have been matched
by extreme measures from the side of the government in the form of ever-greater isolationism
buttressed by time-proven arguments of sovereignty. The threats emboldened the regime to resort
to sovereignty as an effective last resort to shore up impunity, and merely contributed to decreased
visibility of violence and repression, which have now moved offstage.
The rejection of international monitors, a civilian protection force and police observers
has been extended to investigative missions as well. “Angered by the scrutiny, the Nkurunziza
government on October 11, 2016, stopped cooperating with UN agencies, including the UN
Human Rights Council and the International Commission of Inquiry on Burundi.”57 This quote is
one demonstration of the fact that the counterargument “the government would have behaved the
same regardless of international attention” does not hold. Surely, it has taken a radical stance of
no-deals with the opposition (branded as subversives, even terrorists) early on in the crisis and has
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hardly budged since. But dramatic foreign coverage spilling into local crossfire did play its part in
a broader pattern of ‘closing off,’ even if this cannot be quantified.
The government works the international accent on “genocide” into a broader international
conspiracy to undermine the current government. In an informal discussion with a Burundian civil
servant in the summer of 2017, the paranoia of the government was palpable and a major change
from the past. Aside from new scrutiny and even intimidation of researchers (and application of the
friend/enemy labels on them in line with the broader political sphere), it became clear through the
discussion that the international society inclusive of diplomats, NGOs and academics is seen with
suspicion for its potential role in subversion and “covert operations” with the aim to undermine
the government. The government was demonstrating siege mentality.
The increased isolationism and rejection of outside scrutiny has had the opposite effect to
what effective prevention requires, accurate and timely access to vital information. Perhaps
paradoxically, the threats of intervention have also eroded regional and international community’s
leverage in creating the grounds for a workable political dialogue. Genocide is a strong indictment,
and accordingly, such sharp accusations have tended to radicalize the government’s own stance.
The case of Burundi teaches us that genocide framing, when turned into a powerful accusation
married to empty threats, is not simply ineffective but can be counterproductive to the de-escalation
and resolution of the crisis.
Last but not least, we need to return to temporal dynamics once again and consider the
proposition that protracted sounding of alarm devalues the G word as currency in prevention. If
the genocide label is seen as a representational resource, then the case of Burundi opens important
questions about its changing value over time, and the possible impacts of this. The case is unique
as we can observe the genocide label being “spent” intensely for over two years, with the result of
increased attention but failed intervention. In the case of Darfur, Miles has argued that “avoidance
of the signifying label of ‘genocide’ in the media leads to a downgrading of attention to, and
salience of Darfur among the public at large, their elected representatives, and policy makers.”58
But could the reverse—protracted embrace instead of avoidance— equally downgrade attention
and the broader traction of the label? Since the price of a “false negative” is so high, denying or
withdrawing the label is risky and thus unlikely. But only a more systematic and longer-term
study can provide satisfactory insights and validation.
Conclusion
The recent Burundi crisis has offered us a unique laboratory to observe and better understand the
changing political economy of preventative labeling, and the effects that ensue when the genocide
label is embraced actively in attempts to avert escalation of a conflict in a region “known” and
“branded” by its past of genocide. But dominant frames and “lessons of the past” do not always
bode well for prevention, even if these frames carry much weight in terms of alarm. The reading of
genocide into the Burundi crisis, as shown in the paper, has mischaracterized both the causatives and
the descriptives of the unfolding conflict, as well as the nature of actual and likely escalation. More
broadly, the labeling demonstrates the continued traction of certain problematic characterizations
of African conflict as ethnic at its core, and as unchanging over time. The Burundi case carefully
challenges these enduring conceptions and suggests that prevention must be anchored in a closer
reading of conflict and its transformation over time, embracing historicity, change and complexity
and discarding easy analogies and parallels.
Preventive analysis and action must also pay careful attention to its own imbrication in the
dynamics on the ground from which it is far from isolated. Political actors, the opposition, civil
society and sections of the population in Burundi have been attuned to the salience of genocide as
a label and have used it to further their own positions and interests. But the alarmism caused by
the framing has equally the potential to raise anxiety and evoke the traumas of a violent past. By
speaking of and repeatedly highlighting “signals” of imminent genocide, it can also certainly serve
to harden precisely those cleavages that it wants to prevent. Preventative action needs to take into
account such unintended effects.
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But as shown, the effects of labeling Burundi crisis as genocide are wider reaching yet. The
portrayal wasn’t accurate and wasn’t productive of preventive action, but more than this— it has
proven counter-productive. The mislabeling of the crisis as genocide has contributed to the political
standoff. First, the genocide frame and campaigning has over time seen (not necessarily caused)
decreased visibility of violence and repression in Burundi, which has now moved offstage and been
more systematized. This is not an uncommon pattern as open violence is costly in multiple ways,
including political, and economic. The relative “quiet” on the streets merely demonstrates that
repressive control has been successfully exercised. Rather than diffusing grievances, a solidifying
status quo might sharpen them. The mass atrocity campaign misses these dynamics wholly as it
is continually on the search for “signs” of impending mass atrocity, and specifically genocide.
Connected to this then, the genocide labeling has diverted initiative from a civil war focus as a
more pressing threat in terms of escalation.
Second, accusations of genocide have contributed to a broader trend whereby the government
feels besieged by foreign and domestic parties intent to subvert it and responds with closing off
and turning away from cooperation and disposition to engage international pressure. The verve
with which the international community in particular applies what the government sees as an
exaggerated and misfitting label merely confirms its suspicion of a “grand subversion.” In this
manner, the labeling plays its part in the increased retreat of the government from meaningful
dialogue and its intent to entrench the status quo. Reversal in this attitude might come soon; but
rather than being a function of genocide campaigning, it is primarily a function of the dire economic
situation and the regime’s vulnerability vis-à-vis foreign aid and funds.
Last but not least, protracted alarm sounding devalues not only the G-word as currency but,
arguably, strategic labeling as a preventative device in general. Over time, “demonstration effects”
bear their fruit as actors on the ground learn that even intense campaigning is followed by inaction,
repeatedly. The effects of long-term labeling are thus an interesting new chapter in the study of the
political economy of preventative frames and genocide more specifically, and a promising area of
future research. More generally, further research is certainly needed to understand preventive (as
opposed to post-facto) genocide labeling. Nonetheless what is clear already is that all actors in the
enterprise need to think more carefully about their strategies and the full gamut of their impacts.
The sense of uncertainty in an unfolding crisis is real, but a quick deployment of powerful frames
might not prove useful in bringing the crisis to a quicker and less violent close, as Burundi shows.
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